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SPYWARE REGULATION: NATIONAL
LEGISLATION SHOULD PROMPT
INDUSTRY SELF-POLICING
I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of people around the world use the Internet every day.'
Whether they send email, buy books, or trade stocks, users naively
trust that what they do on their computers is their private business.
How wrong they are! In recent years, advertising companies have
discovered ways to send advertisements to consumers that directly
target each individual's Internet habits.2 To know which advertise-
ments should be sent to whom, companies need to do a little
sleuthing. Spyware, "software programs designed to infiltrate a
personal computer to track the user's web activity without that
person's knowledge or consent," does just that.3 Spyware can
change individual computer settings, track personal information
numbers, store credit card numbers, and access all personal data
stored on a computer's hard drive, thereby shredding away every bit
of privacy personal computer users think they have.
4
All of this is done at the consumer's expense for the sake of
advertising companies, which then bombard personal computers with
an incessant stream of unwanted "pop-up" advertisements.,5 There is
a broad consensus that spyware must be stopped. It causes damage
1. Paige Norian, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data Personal: Attempts
to Reform Online Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 52 CATH. U. L.
REv. 803, 803 (2003).
2. See Ronald R. Urbach, Adware/Spyware: An Update Regarding
Pending Litigation and Legislation, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2004, at
12.
3. Rich Ehisen, States Vie with Feds to Stop Spyware, 12 ST. NET
CAPITOL J. 25, 1 (June 21, 2004), at http://www.legislate.com/capj/capj.cgi?
issue=20040621.
4. Id., 3 at http://www.legislate.com/capj/capj.cgi?issue=20040621.
5. See id., at http://www.legislate.com/capj/capj.cgi?issue=20040621;
Urbach, supra note 2, at 12.
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and invades personal privacy.6 There is no consensus, however, as to
how to stop it.
Both houses of Congress have spent more than a year producing
various drafts of anti-spyware legislation.7 Yet, these drafts remain
in committee with much left undone.8 Congress failed to exert a
unified effort recognizing the importance of anti-spyware legislation.
Instead, it put s pyware on the back burner while it tackled more
pressing issues. That is until California, the leading state in
technology and privacy legislation,' 0 took the initiative."
On September 28, 2004, California passed anti-spyware
legislation to protect California citizens from the deceptive and
malicious effects of spyware. 12  Called the California Consumer
Protection Against Computer Spyware Act ("the California Act", or
"the Act"), it prohibits anyone other than a computer's authorized
user from knowingly causing computer software to be copied onto a
computer for purposes prohibited by the Act.13 Less than one week
after the California Act passed, the United States House of
Representatives passed two bills. 14 Thus, after ignoring the spyware
6. Ehisen, supra note 3.
7. U.S. House of Representatives Bill Tracking Report for H.R. 2929,
108th Cong., LEXIS 2003 Bill Tracking H.R. 2929; U.S. Senate Bill Tracking
Report for S. 877, 108th Cong., LEXIS 2003 Bill Tracking S. 877.
8. U.S. House of Representatives Bill Tracking Report for H.R. 2929,
108th Cong., LEXIS 2003 Bill Tracking H.R. 2929; U.S. Senate Bill Tracking
Report for S. 877, 108th Cong., LEXIS 2003 Bill Tracking S. 877.
9. See David McGuire, House Approves Spyware Bills, WASH. POST, Oct.
8, 2004, at E5.
10. California Spyware Bill Gets Industry OK, Awaits Governor's
Signature; Groups Critical, INTERNET LAW & REGULATION (P&F), at http://
intemetlaw.pf.com/subscribers/html/NewNewsArticles.asp (Sept. 3, 2004).
11. California Governor Signs Legislation Against 'Spyware', NAT'L J.
TECH. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WL 74921992.
12. Id.
13. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 22947 (Deering Supp. 2004). Purposes prohibited by the Act
include, among others, deceptively modifying a user's homepage, default
webproxy, or bookmarks; deceptively collecting keystrokes or viewing history;
preventing removal of or disabling of software; intentionally misrepresenting
that software will be uninstalled or disabled; or deceptively rendering security,
anti-spyware, or anti-virus software inoperative. Id. § 22947.2 (a)-(e).
14. Ted Bridis, Bill Imposes Prison Time Over 'Spyware',
BELLEVILLERNEWSDEMOCRAT.COM, at www.belleville.com/mld/charlotte/
news/breakingnews/9860032.html (Oct. 7, 2004).
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problem for over a year, it appears that the California Act may have
prompted the House to act swiftly to pass its own spyware
legislation.
This Note contends that although the California Act attempts to
end spyware and its negative effects, it may not be the proper
solution. Foremost, because the Internet's lack of geographic
boundaries raises murky legal questions regarding interstate
commerce and the dormant Commerce Clause, the Act may be
unconstitutional. Even if the California Act passes constitutional
muster, issues of personal jurisdiction and enforceability surface
when assessing the effect California legislation can have on a
national, and even worldwide, problem. Further, the two House bills
fall short of providing the serious protection consumers need.
Part II presents the serious problem of spyware, its mal-effects,
and how it manages to find its way onto users' computers. Part III
summarizes the California Act's language and provides a critique of
the Act's benefits and shortcomings. Part IV analyzes the many
serious legal questions the California Act raises. Part V questions
whether the California Act attacks the spyware dilemma from the
proper angle, and proposes that national legislation should provide
individual victims with a right to directly sue technology companies
that permit spyware distribution through their networks, systems,
browsers, software applications, and hardware. This radical alter-
native addresses the pressing issue of spyware head on-in a way
that existing and proposed legislation does not. The California Act,
while an important and necessary step toward ending spyware
abuses, is not a final solution. Given the importance of the privacy
rights at stake, there must be a drastic adjustment to the way
legislators address the spyware problem.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE SPYWARE DILEMMA
A. The Nature of Spyware
The term "spyware" refers to software programs that advertising
companies install onto an individual's computer, often without the
person's consent, that track and collect personal information about
the individual, also without consent.' 5 Spyware comes in various
15. Urbach, supra note 2, at 12.
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forms. One type simply installs "adware," which bombards the
individual's computer with countless "pop-up" advertisements.'
6
Another type of spyware program tracks information such as
personal online activities, passwords, and credit card numbers.'
7
This information may then be sold to third-party adware companies
that infiltrate computer systems with adware and "pop-up" advertise-
ments specifically targeted to the user's Internet surfing habits.'
8
While adware programs are simply annoying, spyware programs
that actually track users' online activities and collect personal data
can be dangerous. For example, spyware can access and collect any
personal data stored on a computer's hard drive, including credit card
numbers, personal identification numbers, online banking identifi-
cation numbers, passwords, home addresses, and phone numbers.
19
This is done through "keystroke logging," a method that records
every key typed on a computer.
20
Spyware can also change individual users' personal computer
settings. These changes may include "homepage hijackings that
change a browser's start-up home page, URL redirectors that forward
[website] requests to different [websites], or programs that co-opt a
computer's available processing resources or use the computer as an
open relay for span."21 Spyware programs can even erase users'
hard drives.
22
B. How Spyware Infects Users' Computers
Spyware programs can be installed or downloaded onto users'
computers in numerous ways. Users are most commonly infected
when they intentionally download free file-sharing software or other
programs from the Internet.23 Often, spyware companies will pay
Internet sites such as Kazaa, a music file-sharing site, to bundle their
spyware software with music programs. 24  Before users can
16. Id.
17. Ehisen, supra note 3.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Michael Tonsing, The Battle Against Spyware Is Just Beginning, FED.
LAw., June 2004, at 16, 16.
21. Urbach, supra note 2, at 12.
22. Ehisen, supra note 3.
23. Id.; Urbach, supra note 2, at 12.
24. Ehisen, supra note 3; Urbach, supra note 2, at 12.
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download the programs they desire, they must install the spyware.
Users do so unwittingly when they click on a box containing a
lengthy licensing agreement and a button that says "I agree" or "I
accept." 25  Within the box is the contract one "signs" in order to
download the music, or whatever files they happen to be. Buried
within that contract is a notice that the desired program contains
spyware. 26 Once users click "I agree" to obtain the desired files, they
are in essence agreeing to have spyware installed onto their
computers.
Spyware programs also infiltrate computers through much more
deceptive means. "Drive-by downloads" automatically install spy-
ware onto computers without giving users the option to accept or
decline the installation.2 7 Spyware programs can also be encrypted
28in email attachments. The most ruthless spyware infects users'
computers the instant users visit particular websites. 29 Companies
program these websites simply to attach spyware to visitors'
browsers whose security preferences are set too low.30 As if
accessing personal files, logging individuals' Internet activity, and
obtaining credit card numbers were not bad enough, "most spyware
is deliberately designed to be nearly impossible to uninstall.'
Spyware has stolen personal and crucial information from
individuals. It has corrupted their computers. It has violated their
privacy rights under the California Constitution.
32
Often people do not even know they have spyware on their
computers. 3 They go about their business, paying bills online and
ordering prescriptions, without even realizing others are watching
25. Urbach, supra note 2, at 12.
26. Ehisen, supra note 3.
27. Urbach, supra note, 2 at 12.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Ehisen, supra note 3.
31. Tonsing, supra note 20, at 16. This means, despite how cautious or
limited individuals are in their Internet use, each step taken is still being
logged, and the cruel effects of spyware cannot be reversed without wiping out
all data on users' computers. See id.
32. Computer Spyware: Hearing on S.B. 1436 Before the Assemb. Comm.
on Bus. and Professions, 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. Aug. 12, 2004) [hereinafter
Hearing on S.B. 1436].
33. Tonsing, supra note 20, at 16.
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their every move.34 Can consumers and authorized computer users
go anywhere in cyberspace without being watched? What does
spyware do to the individual's sense of security and trust on the
Internet?
III. THE CALIFORNIA ACT
A. The Language of the California Act
Recognizing the vulnerability of its citizens to relentless
spyware programs, California passed legislation to protect online
activity and personal information.35 In February 2004,36 California
State Senator Kevin Murray introduced the first bill attempting to
protect California consumers from the deceptive and malicious
effects of spyware. 37 After many amendments and modifications, the
Senate passed the California Act, also known as the California
Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act (Senate Bill
381436), on August 26, 2004. Just over one month later, on
September 29th, California Governor Schwarzenegger signed
Murray's anti-spyware legislation into law, and the Act became
effective on January 1, 2005. 39
Often criticized for being too broad, the California Act states,
"[a] person or entity that is not an authorized user... shall not, with
actual knowledge, with conscious avoidance of actual knowledge, or
willfully, cause computer software to be copied onto the computer of
a consumer in this state and use the software to... "perform a
number of prohibited acts. 40 The Act defines "authorized user" as a
person who owns, or who the owner authorizes to use, the com-
34. Id.
35. Hearing on S.B. 1436, supra note 32.
36. California Bill Tracking, S.B. 1436, LEXIS 2003 Bill Tracking S. 1436,
http://www.statenet.com.
37. California Spyware Bill Gets Industry OK, Awaits Governor's
Signature; Groups Critical, supra note 10.
38. California Bill Tracking, S.B. 1436, supra note 36 (bill codified at CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947 (Deering Supp. 2004)).
39. California Governor Signs Legislation Against 'Spyware', supra note
11; Thomas Claburn & George V. Hulne, California Toughens Spyware
Laws-Many Companies Already Comply by Offering Customers Opt-out
Alternative, INFO. WEEK, Oct. 11, 2004, at 26, 26.
40. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 22947.2 (Deering Supp. 2004).
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puter.41 "Consumer" refers to an individual who lives in California
and who uses the computer in question for "personal, family, or
household purposes.
' 42
The California Act addresses spyware's most nefarious
activities. The Act prohibits a person or entity from intentionally
modifying any Internet browser or security settings on an authorized
user's computer. 43 It also prohibits collecting personally identifiable
information including names, credit or debit card numbers,
passwords or personal identification numbers, social security
numbers, account balances, user activity logs, or addresses through
keystroke logging. One may not install software without the user's
knowledge or consent, or install programs that extract data from the
user's hard drive.44 Further, software programs may not legally
prevent authorized users from attempting to block the installation of
or disabling of software. 4 5 Nor may a software distributor intention-
ally misrepresent that the software will be uninstalled or disabled
according to the user's wishes when this is not in fact the case.46
Moreover, the Act prohibits a person or entity from removing anti-
virus software from an authorized user's computer.47 Finally, the
Act proscribes taking control over an authorized user's computer to
gain access to information or to cause damage to the computer.
4 8
The California Act also lists legitimate software functions, which are
not considered surreptitious spyware actions, to which the Act does
not apply.
49
Although the California Act does not specifically address
enforcement, it may provide for a private right of action for
consumers and Internet Service Providers to bring lawsuits seeking
actual damages, liquidated damages of up to $1000 per violation, and
attorneys' fees against purveyors of software.5 0 The Business and
41. Id. § 22947.1.
42. Id.
43. Id. §§ 22947.1-22947.4.
44. Id.
45. Id. §§ 22947.2-22947.3.
46. Id. § 22947.2.
47. Id.
48. Id. §§ 22947.2-22947.3.
49. Id. §22947.3.
50. Computer Spyware: Hearing on S.B. 1436 Before the S., 2003-2004
Sess. (Cal. Aug. 19, 2004); Reed Freeman Jr., Federal and State Governments
2225December 2005]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:2219
Professions Code codifies the California Act as a civil statute with
only civil, and not criminal, penalties.5'
B. Evaluating the California Act
Competing interests between consumers and the technology
industry illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of the California Act.
Consumer advocates want anti-spyware laws that vigilantly protect
consumers' privacy by setting forth a clear, comprehensive set of
prohibited acts and remedies. 52  Adware providers and other
technology companies, on the other hand, fear that overly broad anti-
spyware legislation could hinder legitimate Internet business,
technological advances, innovation, and competition.
53
In the final days before the California Senate passed Murray's
anti-spyware legislation, the Internet industry presented numerous
amendments that it considered crucial to its support of the bill.54 The
industry primarily concerned itself with the breadth of the proposed
legislation. 55  Companies feared that the Act would make many
legitimate and necessary software functions unlawful, thus exposing
them to frivolous litigation.5 6 Murray accepted their amendments,
hoping to create a stroner bill that Governor Schwarzenegger would
be more likely 
to sign.
5 
Many corporations, including Time Warner, the American
Electronics Association, TechNet, and Yahoo!, ultimately backed
Murray's bill.58 These companies felt that the amendments tightened
up the language of the bill to focus upon "practices that are really
Turn Their Attention to Spyware and Adware, E-COMMERCE L. & STRATEGY,
Aug. 30, 2004, at 1, 5; Verne Kopytoff, Legislation Aims to Block Spyware;
State, Federal Bills Seek to Ease Net Users' Growing Frustration, S.F.
CHRoN., Oct. 4, 2004, at C1. How exactly the number of violations is to be
calculated and the details of enforcement have yet to be articulated.
Amendment to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22947, LEXIS 2005 Bill Text CA
S.B. 355.
51. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 22947 (Deering Supp. 2004).
52. Urbach, supra note 2, at 14.
53. Id.
54. See Hearing on S.B. 1436, supra note 32.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See California Spyware Bill Gets Industry OK, Awaits Governor's
Signature; Groups Critical, supra note 10.
58. Id.
2226
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most associated with spyware and deceptive business practices, the
things that people complain about.",59 Without the amendments,
major software products such as Microsoft's Windows operating
system, and web browsers like Internet Explorer and Netscape,
would have fallen within the Act's definition of spyware.60 Many
businesses were concerned that legitimate practices such as online
banking, security updates, or pornography blocking, would put them
at serious risk of expensive and time-consuming litigation.
6 1
Because the amendments mitigated these concerns, key industry
players supported the California Act.
62
Privacy proponents, however, criticized the amended version as
too weak.63 They pushed for a notice and consent provision requir-
ing every software program to provide a pop-up window indicating
when the program was about to install spyware and providing the
user with an opportunity to refuse the installation.64 Privacy pro-
ponents adamantly supported this language because it would provide
for informed, consensual decisions regarding computer and Internet
security.
65
At the last minute, however, Murray accepted amendments to
the Act that removed the notice and consent requirement.66 The
acknowledged main reason for removing the language was that no
individual user would knowingly provide the consent needed to
download the spyware.67 This would cause advertising companies
responsible for "pop-up" advertisements to go out of business.
Without spyware, programs would not be able to track users' Internet
activities, and would thus be unable to provide specifically targeted
"pop-up" advertisements. 68  Murray desperately needed industry
support for his Act to pass, and he knew he would not receive it if the
59. Id.
60. Tonsing, supra note 20, at 17.
61. See Hearing on S.B. 1436, supra note 32.
62. California Spyware Bill Gets Industry OK, Awaits Governor's
Signature; Groups Critical, supra note 10.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See Kopytoff, supra note 50; California Spyware Bill Gets Industry OK,
Awaits Governor's Signature; Groups Critical, supra note 10.
67. See Hearing on S.B. 1436, supra note 32.
68. Interview with James Jenal, Counsel, O'Melveny & Myers, in Los
Angeles, Cal. (Sept. 27, 2004) (on file with author).
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notice and consent language remained.
Murray also articulated another reason for removing the notice
and consent requirement. Requiring companies to design the pop-up
windows to provide notice, which would ultimately cause them to
lose business, would be too costly.69  Many legitimate software
programs that do not "spy" on users' every move would be required
to provide pop-up windows explaining what was about to be
downloaded onto a user's computer. 70 Legislators were worried that
users would refuse consent to legitimate programs out of fear of
downloading harmful ones.71 This would interfere with legitimate
business and impede technological advancement. 72 Some legitimate
companies might take a business risk and choose not to provide
notice in order to avoid costs, exposing themselves to the possibility
of litigation to prove that they are not in fact spyware.73 Notice and
consent, so the argument went, would chill the Internet industry
74
and make consumers too paranoid to conduct business online.
Notwithstanding these industry concerns, privacy proponents
such as the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and the World Privacy
Forum believe that the Act's language is too weak to provide
effective protection for California consumers.75 The legislation's
goal was consumer protection, and removing the notice and consent
language left consumers vulnerable. 76 According to Beth Givens,
Executive Director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, "California
is [not] putting its best foot forward in enacting this bill into law."
77
Referring to the California Act, Pam Dixon of the World Privacy
Forum stated, "it's better to have no legislation than legislation that
doesn't protect consumers." 78 In her view, if Californians think they
have taken measures to protect consumers, the state will move onto
69. See Hearing on S.B. 1436, supra note 32.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. California Spyware Bill Gets Industry OK, Awaits Governor's
Signature; Groups Critical, supra note 10.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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other issues even though the measures are inadequate.
79
There are some consumer protection advocates, however, who
do feel that the Act is a step in the right direction. Michael Ross of
the California Alliance for Consumer Protection believes that until
there is national legislation, it is better to have some consumer pro-
tection than none at all. 80 Ross believes that even without the notice
and consent requirement there will be a "dramatic change" in the
way software companies do business because "these companies are
now scared to death.",8' Thus, legislators must walk a fine line
between frightening software programmers in order to end spyware
and impeding the advancement of Internet technology.
Critics of the California Act are also concerned that the
legislation only imposes civil penalties under the Business and
Professions Code and not criminal sanctions. 82 The Act provides for
a private right of action and liquidated damages of up to $1000 per
violation. 83  Placing anti-spyware legislation in the Business and
Professions Code, however, emphasizes business regulation over
privacy rights. Some question whether a $1000 fine per violation
constitutes a sufficient deterrent, or whether companies will simply
factor the cost of violations into their profit calculations. Moreover,
criminal penalties could be a more effective deterrent.
State legislators, however, may be less willing to criminalize
spyware dissemination. 84  Massachusetts, New York, and New
Jersey's proposals providing for criminalization of spyware activity
have remained "bogged down in committee" (although not
85necessarily due to their criminal provisions). California's Act, on
the other hand, providing exclusively for civil penalties, became law.
If criminal sanctions are in fact impeding anti-spyware legislation's
passage, legislation imposing only civil sanctions may be better than
none at all.
The question remains, however, whether a law such as the
California Act is the most effective way to tackle spyware invasions.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See generally Ehisen, supra note 3 (discussing states imposing criminal
sanctions and those only imposing civil penalties).
83. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
84. See Ehisen, supra note 3.
85. Id.
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Perhaps, given spyware's extreme intrusiveness, a "good start" is
insufficient. In order for Internet commerce to function, consumers
need to feel secure when typing in their credit card numbers to buy a
book, a plane ticket, or even a car. A "good start" may leave
consumers feeling violated and unprotected. This too may impede
technological advancement.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL QUESTIONS
IMPLICATED BY THE CALIFORNIA ACT
California's anti-spyware legislation effort is laudable. The
state has taken steps to protect its consumers from fraud, invasion of
privacy, and malicious acts on the Internet. Facially, the California
Act appears to protect individual computer users and to help them
regain trust in the security of Internet activities. The California Act
raises serious legal concerns, however, which ultimately suggest a
need for national legislation. Although the California Act aims to
protect California consumers, it may be unconstitutional because it
arguably regulates interstate commerce in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause.8 6 Further, even if the law is constitutional, since
spyware programs affect individual computer users throughout the
world, it is questionable whether a California law could be
effectively enforced against perpetrators outside California borders.
8 7
National legislation, on the other hand, can provide broader
enforcement and a strong deterrent.
Currently there are federal laws that arguably regulate the same
subject matter as the California Act including the Federal Trade
Commission Act,88 the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 9 and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.90 In October 2004, the
United States House of Representatives passed two additional pieces
of legislation to help implement these existing federal laws. 91 If
ratified, this legislation could preempt the California Act.
92
86. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
87. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1991 & Supp. 2004).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1992 & Supp. 2004).
90. Id. § 2510.
91. Bridis, supra note 14 (referring to the Internet Spyware Prevention Act
(I-SPY Act) and Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act (SPY
ACT)).
92. These pieces of legislation could trump the California Act with much
2230
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Unfortunately, none of this legislation attacks the root of the spyware
problem-lack of an adequate enforcement mechanism. Thus,
national legislation should provide victims with a private cause of
action against technology leaders who permit spyware to travel
through their networks, systems, browsers, software applications,
and hardware. This is the most effective way to provide Internet
consumers nationwide with protection and a sense of security.
A. The California Act May Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states,
"[t]he Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce...
among the several States.. . .93 Although this language constitutes
an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court has
also interpreted the Commerce Clause to act as a "dormant," or
implicit, limitation on states' authority to enact laws that unduly
burden interstate commerce. 94  In other words, the dormant
Commerce Clause prevents states from enacting regulation in certain
areas designated to Congress, even if Congress has not yet acted in
that area.
The Supreme Court has established two tests for determining
whether state legislation violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
95
The first test asks whether the law facially discriminates against
interstate commerce. 96 The Supreme Court has held that state laws
that regulate commerce occurring outside state borders, regardless of
whether the commerce has effects within the state, have been found
to offend the dormant Commerce Clause. 97 This is a strict scrutiny
test, meaning that the Court will uphold a law only if it is proven
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.99 The law must be
stronger penalties.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
94. Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 262 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989));
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Skyes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 788 (2001).
95. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262.
96. Id.
97. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
98. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
99. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 529 (2001).
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narrowly tailored, and there must be no less restrictive means the
state can employ to achieve its goals. 100 The Court's list of activities
that qualify as affecting interstate commerce is expansive, and "it is
unlikely that any state law regulating the Internet would avoid
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny."
10'
If the law does not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce, the Court applies a balancing test to determine whether
the law imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is "clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."'1 2 Under this
less restrictive test, the law is "presumptively valid" unless the
burden imposed on interstate commerce greatly outweighs the
benefits of the regulation.10 3 The Supreme Court has recognized that
virtually every state law will in some way affect interstate
commerce. 1°4 Thus, "where the [law] regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits."'
05
The Court has also held that the dormant Commerce Clause
prohibits state laws that lead to inconsistent regulatory burdens.
10 6
This requirement does not mandate uniformity in state laws, but does
attempt to protect out-of-state actors burdened by the state law who
are unable to partake in the political process of the state that created
the law at issue.1
0 7
1. Recent Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test
A survey of recent court decisions applying the strict scrutiny
test to laws that allegedly regulate commerce occurring outside a
state's borders indicates that courts will most likely find that the
100. Id.
101. Joseph Hameline & William Miles, The Dormant Commerce Clause
Meets the Internet, B. B.J., Oct. 1997, at 8, 9.
102. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)).
103. Hameline & Miles, supra note 101, at 20.
104. Id. at22.
105. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
106. Goldsmith & Skyes, supra note 94, at 789.
107. Id. at 795.
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California Act violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The most
recent California case to address the dormant Commerce Clause in
the Internet context is Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc.,10 8 a 2002
California Court of Appeal case. In Ferguson, the challenged
California law regulated the conduct of persons or entities doing
business in California who transmitted unsolicited email documents
containing advertisements to California residents, from equipment
located in California.1° 9 The law targeted only those doing business
in California; it covered only messages sent from computers located
in California, to California residents located in California.
110
Applying the strict scrutiny analysis from Healy v. Beer Institute,"'I
the California Court of Appeal concluded that the law did not violate
the dormant Commerce Clause."12
Healy established the principles for determining whether
interstate effects of state regulations on commerce violate the
dormant Commerce Clause. 1
13
[A] state [law] that directly regulates commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of the state violates the
commerce clause .... [T]o determine whether a [law]
impermissibly controls commerce outside the state, a court
should evaluate the practical effect of the [law] by
considering "the consequences of the [law] itself... [and]
how the challenged [law] may interact with the legitimate
regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would
arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar
legislation."' 14
Applying these principles, the Healy Court determined that the law
in question violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it had
the effect of controlling beer prices in other states. 115
The Ferguson court applied the Healy principles and reached the
opposite conclusion, upholding the California law. 116 The Ferguson
108. 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
109. Id. at 260.
110. Id.
111. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
112. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263-64.
113. Healy, 491 U.S. at 331-43.
114. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264 (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 336).
115. Healy, 491 U.S. at 338-40.
116. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264-66.
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court reasoned that the law in question did not regulate commerce
occurring wholly outside California because the law applied only to
unsolicited email sent from a computer in California to a California
resident. 17 The court also determined that the California law did not
regulate the "Internet or Internet use per se," 118 which could extend
beyond the borders of California. The California law only regulated
individuals and entities doing business in California who use
equipment within California to send unsolicited email to California
residents."l 9 The court determined that a geographic location could
be established for the equipment located within California, and the
California residents who were receiving the unsolicited emails within
California.120 The court therefore decided that the argument that this
law "functions in cyberspace" and is "wholly insensitive to
geographic distinctions" has no basis.121 Since the California law in
Ferguson only had effects within the state of California, the court did
not concern itself with other states passing similar, conflicting regu-
lations.
2. Applying the Strict Scrutiny Test to the California Act
Unlike the Ferguson law, the California Act's language
regarding the origin or cause of the harm is not state-specific. The
Act states that, "[a] person or entity that is not an authorized user,...
shall not, with actual knowledge... cause computer software to be
copied onto the computer of a consumer in this state and use the
software to do... "a number of prohibited acts.122 The law does not
target any actor based upon geographic location. It imposes liability
upon offensive websites and spyware programmers located anywhere
California has the capacity to exercise jurisdiction, and therefore
discriminates against spyware programmers choosing to engage in
interstate commerce. 12 3 The California Act thus directly regulates
117. Id.
118. Id. at 264.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
122. Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 22947.2, 22947.3 (Deering Supp. 2004).
123. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169-70 (finding a New York Internet
regulation that imposed liability on anyone over whom the state could exercise
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commerce occurring wholly outside the state, and thus violates the
dormant Commerce Clause under Healy.
Moreover, while the Ferguson law did not regulate "Internet or
Internet use per se,"'124 the California Act specifically regulates
Internet use that extends beyond California's borders. The California
Act does not target people or entities within a specific geographic
location who commit a specific act, such as sending unsolicited
email messages from California computers to California citizens, but
rather targets installing spyware, a specific Internet activity. 12  The
spyware installers' location when they cause harm to California
consumers' computers is irrelevant. All that matters is that spyware
committed one of the prohibited acts mentioned in the California
Act. The Act holds the spyware culprit liable, which thereby affects
interstate commerce.
In American Libraries Association v. Pataki,126 a Second Circuit
district court found that a law prohibiting use of a computer to
disseminate obscene content to minors violated the dormant
Commerce Clause because the law regulated conduct occurring
wholly outside the state of New York.127  The Pataki court
emphasized that the nature of the Internet "makes it impossible to
restrict the effects of the New York Act to conduct occurring within
New York.' ' 128 Further, the Pataki law applied to "all Internet
activity," and not only to email distributors within New York who
sent email to others located within New York.129 The California Act
parallels the law questioned in Pataki in that it applies to all
spyware-related violations across the Internet, and it would be
impossible to restrict the effects of prohibiting spyware activities to
conduct that only occurs within California.
As a result, the California Act directly discriminates against out-
of-state citizens, while indirectly benefiting its own citizens. The
legislature passed the California Act to protect its own citizens from
jurisdiction to be unconstitutional in violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause).
124. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264.
125. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947.2, 22947.3.
126. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
127. Id. at 163.
128. Id. at 177.
129. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265 (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n v.
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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the mal-effects of spyware. 130 The Act, however, reaches beyond
California's borders, ultimately forcing non-California citizens to
comply with its provisions. The law in Pataki did not withstand
scrutiny because "conduct that [might have been] legal in the state in
which the user act[ed could] subject the user to prosecution in New
York and thus subordinate the user's home state's policy.., to New
York's local concerns."' 3 1  Similarly, under California's anti-
spyware legislation, those living in California enjoy an advantage
over those living outside of California. If all forty nine other states
fail to enact anti-spyware legislation or enact legislation inconsistent
with the California Act, in the absence of federal legislation, the
California Act potentially subordinates each state's policies to
California's. Forcing all citizens to comply with both California's
legislation and that that of their own state, would arguably constitute
discrimination in violation of interstate commerce because this
would place a greater burden on those living outside of California,
while benefiting only Californians.
13 2
The California Act thus appears to fail the dormant Commerce
Clause's strict scrutiny test by discriminating against out-of-state
participants in interstate commerce for the benefit of California
residents. Although protecting California consumers from malicious
spyware constitutes a compelling state interest, the state did not
narrowly tailor the Act to further this interest, and there are less
restrictive means available to meet California's objectives. As
emphasized by the Ferguson law, one way for the California Act to
withstand strict scrutiny is by narrowly tailoring it to specific actors
within California. 133 Broadening the Act to cover all Internet activity
opens the door to direct dormant Commerce Clause violations that
could have been avoided if the law had been narrowly tailored to
impact only California residents.
130. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947.
131. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
132. This is not to say, of course, that California is exempt from having to
follow other states' legislation if it applies to California residents. However,
this is not relevant to the issue of whether the law at hand violates the dormant
Commerce Clause. The only concern is whether the law discriminates against
interstate commerce, while benefiting residents within the state imposing the
legislation.
133. Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265.
2236
SPYWARE REGULATION
3. Applying the Balancing Test to the California Act
In addition to the conclusion that the California Act fails the
strict scrutiny test by regulating commerce occurring wholly outside
California's boundaries in a discriminatory fashion, the California
Act also likely fails the dormant Commerce Clause's balancing test.
Under the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, if a law does not
facially discriminate against out-of-state interests, it may nonetheless
be invalid if its incidental burdens on interstate commerce are clearly
excessive in relation to the local benefits. 134 Although California has
a very strong interest in protecting its citizens from spyware, this
interest is outweighed by the burdens the Act imposes upon other
states.
California is justifiably trying to protect its consumers from the
negative and deceptive ramifications of spyware programs.'
35
Spyware invades individuals' privacy and spyware programmers are
untrustworthy. 136 Computer users often have no idea that spyware
programs are present. Further, once a user does begin experiencing
computer problems and determines that spyware is the offender,
"most spyware is deliberately designed to be nearly impossible to
uninstall."'137 This results in heavy costs to consumers in terms of
time and money. States clearly have a substantial interest in
preventing the cost-shifting to consumers inherent in the distribution
of many spyware programs.'3 8 States also have a legitimate interest
in protecting consumers against the use of spyware to delete the
contents of hard drives, steal credit card and personal identification
numbers, install computer viruses, and manipulate computer
settings. 139 When California passed the Act, there was no national
anti-spyware legislation in place. The need to act to prevent
spyware's harms at a time when the federal government is failing to
do so is also arguably a legitimate state interest.
134. Id. at 262.
135. See Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act, CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 22947 (Deering Supp. 2004).
136. See generally Norian, supra note I (discussing the need to maintain
online privacy in a society where the current state of consumer privacy is
grossly inadequate).
137. Tonsing, supra note 20, at 16.
138. See Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268 (citing State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d
404, 410 (Wash. 2001)).
139. Seeid.
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The burdens the Act imposes on interstate commerce none-
theless outweigh its local benefits. First and foremost, upholding the
California legislation could encourage other states to pass similar
legislation, ultimately subjecting spyware activities to inconsistent
regulations and raising a major dormant Commerce Clause
concern. 140 This is not to say that states may never enact their own
regulations. To the contrary, the dormant Commerce Clause is not
triggered every time states promulgate different substantive
regulations. 141 Permitting each state, however, to implement its own
anti-spyware legislation could result in constitutional violation.
[W]hat is a legitimate use of the Internet in an individual's
home state may be considered a violation of state law
elsewhere. Thus, an individual must not only comply with
his forum [state's Internet regulations], but he must also be
aware of any current law regarding regulation of the
Internet throughout the country.
Different regulations across the country could result in such high
compliance costs that they would outweigh any plausible regulatory
benefits. 143  For example, technology companies might cease to
develop new products for fear of being sued for violating any one of
the many inconsistent state spyware laws. Legitimate websites might
shut down out of fear of litigation, thus limiting society's access to
valuable information. In this way, inconsistent legislation could chill
advancement of technology nationally.
It is also possible that multiple inconsistent state laws will
render spyware legislation unenforceable. With such varied anti-
spyware legislation, spyware programmers may decide to take a
calculated risk that they would fall through the cracks created by
state law inconsistencies. As a result, laws like the California Act
would have accomplished nothing, and would send the message to
spyware programmers that the country has no control over spyware.
This could result in more, rather than less, spyware, wreaking greater
havoc than ever before.
The Pataki court stated, "the Internet is one of those areas of
140. Goldsmith & Skyes, supra note 94, at 789-90.
141. Id. at 790, 806.
142. Spencer Kass, Regulation and the Internet, 26 S.U. L. REV. 93, 104
(1998).
143. Goldsmith & Skyes, supra note 94, at 806-07.
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commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect
users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme,
could paralyze development of the Internet altogether."' 144  This
reasoning is sensible. The severe burdens that the California Act
may impose upon interstate commerce demonstrate that spyware
regulation is an area best suited for national control.
Overall, in weighing the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce against the dangers that could result from inconsistent
state regulations, it is clear that state interests must yield to the
greater need to protect interstate commerce. Further, the states'
legitimate interests in enacting spyware legislation might in fact be
better served at the federal level. Thus, the California Act clearly
violates the dormant Commerce Clause under both the strict scrutiny
and balancing tests.
B. The Enforceability of the California Act
Even if the California Act passes constitutional muster, it would
be outrageously impractical to enforce. United States House
Representative Zoe Lofgren, a Democrat from California, said
spyware is "quickly becoming one of the biggest threats to
consumers on the Intemet."' 145 She was referring not only to
California, or even to the United States, but to the entire world. A
state law only affects one state, while spyware is truly a global
problem. 146 Enforcing a California state law prohibiting spyware
activity originating from any geographic source would only provide
California residents with redress. The California Act does not
protect consumers in the other forty nine states, or the rest of the
world, from spyware. This raises questions as to the Act's
effectiveness in eradicating spyware nationally. Moreover, the
California Act's enforceability rests on the assumption that a
spyware programmer can be identified for suit, which is generally
not the case.
As Internet technology has boomed in recent years, the courts
have had to play catch up with the interpretation of laws designed to
regulate cyberspace. 147  Adapting existing laws that regulate
144. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
145. Bridis, supra note 14.
146. See Ehisen, supra note 3.
147. See Urbach, supra note 2, at 14.
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traditional media forms, such as newspapers and television stations,
to issues that arise on the Internet may work in some instances, but
not in others. For example, the Internet raises unique questions of
personal jurisdiction. 48 Whether a court has personal jurisdiction
over a particular defendant depends on the extent of the defendant's
contacts with the state in which the court sits.' 49 The defendant has
"minimum contacts" with the state if 1) the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in that state,
thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the state's laws, and
2) the cause of action arose from, or is substantially related to, the
purposeful actions within the state.1
50
Applying the minimum contacts test to the Internet context can
be confusing. When a person posts a website, it is unclear which
state's laws govern activities resulting from use of the website. The
fact that the website might be accessed anywhere in the world could
mean that a defendant website developer could be subject to personal
jurisdiction everywhere. 15 1  In Zippo Manufacturing Company v.
Zippo.com, Inc., 152 the court placed commercial Internet activities on
a spectrum. Where the website falls on this spectrum determines
whether the court has personal jurisdiction. 153 At one end of the
spectrum are "passive" websites that simply make information
available to users. 154  "Passive" sites do not confer personal
jurisdiction on out-of-state defendants.' 55 At the other end of the
spectrum are "active" websites, which clearly do business and enter
"into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the
Internet."' 156 "Active" websites do confer personal jurisdiction on
out-of-state defendants.' 57  "The middle ground is occupied by
interactive websites where a user can exchange information with the
148. See Kass, supra note 141, at 93.
149. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
150. See id.
151. Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 GA. L. REv.
991, 995 (2004).
152. 952F. Supp. It19(W.D. Pa. 1997).
153. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website."'
5 8
The Zippo test has never been applied to spyware. Spyware
does not fall neatly into any of the Zippo categories. Spyware
programs are not websites, though some spyware programs do
automatically download themselves onto users' computers when
users visit a particular website. For spyware to be "active" in the
Zippo sense, some form of business activity or contractual
transaction would have to occur. Neither of these requirements
exists with respect to spyware's uninformed, nonconsensual
installations. Yet, spyware does satisfy Zippo's requirement that
there be "knowing and repeated transmissions of computer files over
the Internet," 59 as spyware distributors are aware of their
transmissions, even if they do not know exactly where the spyware
will end up, and users are not aware of its presence.
Spyware programs may nonetheless be "active" by analogy,
therefore subjecting spyware distributors to personal jurisdiction in
every state where harm occurs. Although spyware programs are not
websites and do not conduct business directly with individual users
whose computers the programs infiltrate, websites often hire spyware
programmers to collect personal information about users who visit
their websites. Websites thus often conduct spyware activities in
anticipation of contracts.
Along those same lines, spyware programmers consciously and
intentionally access individual computers via the Internet for
commercial purposes-to sell products for the companies that hire
them. Spyware programmers know they are tapping into users'
computers all over the world. Under the Zippo analysis, then,
spyware programs are "active" because they knowingly cause harm
to computers in anticipation, in furtherance, and in pursuit of
commercial activity. By this reasoning, spyware programmers
should be subject to personal jurisdiction wherever harm occurs as a
result of their programs.
This analysis presents hope for haling the world's spyware
programmers and offending websites into California courts under the
158. Id.
159. Id.
2241December 2005]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:2219
Act. The question remains, however, as to how effective a state law
designed to serve its own citizens can be at addressing a problem of
global proportions. Granted, the Act may make California citizens
feel more secure, and one cannot blame the California Senate for
choosing to protect its citizens. A state law, however, is not the most
effective means for reducing harmful conduct related to spyware.
Thus, national legislators have a duty to protect the entire nation's
citizens by passing federal spyware legislation.
The Internet industry strongly supports a national solution to the
spyware problem. 160 Corporations do not want to be bothered with
conflicting state regulations they may be concurrently violating in
the course of business. One "strong national law,"'161 instead of up to
fifty inconsistent laws, would facilitate compliance.
C. Current House Bills Leave Much to be Desired
Current legislation and the above analysis assume that victims of
malicious spyware can identify the website or spyware program that
caused them harm. To the contrary, users often only understand that
their computers are not functioning properly without knowing why.
Further, some spyware functions invisibly, such that consumers see
no sign of violations. 162 Perhaps most infuriating, users sometimes
know something is wrong, and know that spyware is the culprit, but
cannot identify which spyware program caused the harm, when it did
so, or how. This inability to identify the perpetrator, or even the
harm, poses a serious obstacle to seeking effective redress against
spyware programmers, and constitutes a major flaw in the California
Act.
The two House bills passed in October 2004 to end spyware
activity share the same flaw. While national legislation is a major
step in the right direction, as it eliminates the problem of multiple,
inconsistent bills, the end goal must always be kept in mind-the
legislation must protect consumers from unauthorized spyware on
their computers.
The House first passed the Securely Protect Yourself Against
160. Ed Fletcher, Closing the Door on Spyware: State and Federal Efforts
Target Software that Quietly Tracks Where Broswers Go on the Internet,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 29,2004, at A3.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part II.
2242
SPYWARE REGULATION
Cyber Trespass Act ("SPY ACT") on October 5, 2004, less than a
week after California signed the California Act into law.'63 The SPY
ACT imposes civil penalties that are much harsher than those under
the California Act.' The SPY ACT provides for fines ranging from
$11,000 to $3,000,000. 165 These steep fines may increase
compliance. Further, the bill contains a notice and consent
requirement, similar to that removed from the California Act. 166 It
requires programmers to notify computer users in "plain language"
that the program about to be downloaded will collect and transmit
information about the user to other sources. 167 At that point, the user
must have a clear option to grant or deny permission for the tran-
saction. 1
68
On October 7, 2004, the House passed a second bill, called the
Internet Spyware Prevention Act ("I SPY Act"). 169 This bill gives
the United States Attorney General $10,000,000 to "crack down on
companies and others that secretly install spyware" in order to
discourage the use of spyware. 170 Those who violate the I SPY Act
could face criminal penalties of up to five years in jail.'1
7
Each of these bills articulates that it preempts and supersedes
any state law that expressly regulates "deceptive conduct with
respect to computers."" 2 Although these bills facially appear to be
much stronger and more effective against spyware than the
California Act, it may be that neither will be enacted in its current
form. Only the House passed the bills, just days before Congress
was supposed to go home and work on the presidential race and their
163. Bill Imposes Hefty 'Spyware' Fines (Oct. 5, 2005), available at http://
www.glispa.net/index.tempnews 1.html.
164. Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929,
108th Cong. (2003).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Cong.
(2003).
170. Id.; Bridis, supra note 14.
171. Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Cong.
(2003); Bridis, supra note 14.
172. Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Cong.
(2003); Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 2929,
108th Cong. (2003).
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own campaigns. 173 Critics of the House bills claim that the issue is
not ripe for discussion, as shown by the fact that the House presented
two separate bills. 174 Critics further contend that "you don't just pass
something because Congress has an artificial deadline- of going home
this Friday or Saturday."'175 Thus, these critics believe that the House
passed the bills too hastily, that more time should have been taken on
such a serious issue, and that both Houses should have passed a
unified bill. Further complicating the issue, the Senate also has
spyware legislation of its own in the works.' 
76
Various obstacles, including time and differences between the
House and Senate bills, may hinder passage of the House bills. This
could ultimately delay an effective federal solution even longer. In
any event, the federal bills would not be effective for "12 months
after [passage] and would automatically expire after 2009." ! 77 The
California Act, by comparison, became effective on January 1, 2005.
Preemption does not, therefore, immediately threaten the California
Act.
Further, just like the California Act, the House bills do not
account for the difficulty of identifying violative spyware
programmers and websites, which surreptitiously download spyware
onto users' computers.
V. A RADICAL PROPOSAL
Determining who or what entity is responsible for spyware
destruction on users' computers is the main concern yet to be
effectively addressed by either the California Act or the two House
bills. In theory, users should be able to go after the spyware
programmers or websites causing the harm. However, since they are
so hard to identify, it may be impossible to enforce a judgment
against them. Spyware programs could therefore continue to
function without ramifications under all of the proposed spyware
acts. This article proposes that legislators address this concern by
holding responsible those with the power to minimize spyware
harms, namely those who permit spyware to run over their networks
173. McGuire, supra note 9.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Bill Imposes Hefty 'Spyware'Fines, supra note 162.
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and operating systems, and those who allow spyware to go
undetected in their web browsers, software applications, and
hardware.
This solution focuses less on who is directly at fault for spyware,
and more on arriving at a workable solution to the problem by
shifting the costs of harm away from innocent users and toward those
industry players who are in the best position to protect consumers
from spyware. Entities such as Microsoft, Dell, Adelphia, and
Verizon have the resources and ability to solve the spyware problem
for consumers.
To remedy the spyware problem, the Internet industry should
police itself. Major manufacturers of computing hardware, operating
systems and software applications, web browsers, and the multitude
of major Internet providers all profit from consumers using the
Internet where users access websites and spyware programs that
cause them harm. These corporations are in the best position to
crack down on malicious spyware. Major players could, for
example, build spyware blockers into their software, browsers, and
connections. Just as these companies distribute and constantly
update anti-virus programs, they can produce and distribute anti-
spyware programs and constantly update them as spyware evolves.
Major industry players have the resources and capability to prevent
spyware from infecting our computers and poisoning our lives.
Currently, many Internet-related companies have created
programs designed to block "pop-up" advertisements as well as
programs that give consumers more control over what websites
download onto their computers.1 78  For instance, Internet Service
Providers "have made pop-up blocking software a standard part of
their services."' 79  Additionally, Microsoft has developed a new
service pack for Windows XP that will display a dialog box on
computer users' screens whenever applications try to install
themselves onto users' computers, and provide management tools to
help disable those applications.18 0  It is evident that these
178. Urbach, supra note 2, at 14-15.
179. Id. at 14. However, these pop-up blocking features are only effective
against ads that are served by a website; they are ineffective against ads that
are served by third-party applications that install adware or spyware programs
onto individual users' computers. Id.
180. Id. at 14-15.
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corporations have the capability to create programs that prevent
spyware activities, yet nothing requires them to do so. As a result,
there is haphazard and unreliable protection from the ones with the
greatest potential for ending the spyware phenomenon. The
possibility of exposure to liability for harm to consumers, however,
would prod the industry into full gear, on a global basis.' 8 ' Thus,
placing liability on major Internet providers is the most effective way
to protect computer users from spyware nationwide.
When the Internet began, the number and nature of Internet
users was limited. 8 2  As a result, the protocol for designing
computers and Internet controls presumed the existence of trusting
relationships. Thus, the Internet did not require or develop many
security or preventative measures. This is no longer true today.
Many Internet users and service providers are not trustworthy, and
consumers need more protection than what currently exists. If the
goal of anti-spyware legislation is to end spyware maladies, going
after the "little guys," the spyware programmers, will not achieve it.
Instead, legislation should target the industry's deep pockets, those
who profit from the status quo and who can and should be
responsible for industry excesses.
A national bill allowing computer users harmed by spyware to
directly sue major manufacturers of operating systems, application
programs, hardware, and web browsers, as well as major Internet
Service Providers, would provide victimized users with an
identifiable defendant, from whom to seek redress.
A comparison can be drawn between liability for harm caused
by spyware and harm caused by car accidents. Car owners may sue
Ford or General Motors for product defects or malfunctions when a
car is unsafe. A web browser or operating system that allows
thousands of spyware programs to invade personal computers and
harm users is similarly defective and unsafe. Just as society holds
car manufacturers accountable for unsafe defects, we should hold the
Internet industry accountable for harms caused by spyware. The
Internet industry is permitting pernicious software programs to flow
181. To further ensure compliance, the legislature could consider providing
tax write-offs to Internet-related companies for the money spent on developing
the necessary technology, programs, and applications to provide national
spyware protection.
182. Interview with James Jenal, supra note 68.
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across their networks, through their equipment, and via their
software applications, extracting private information from users'
computers. Users should be able to collect damages from these
actors for these harms. Granted, the harm to an individual from
unsafe computers is more subtle than that caused to an individual
from a car defect. Nevertheless, both industries must be held equally
accountable for allowing detrimental, invasive, and malicious harm.
The California Act and the two House bills provide reliable
language defining what Internet activities constitute spyware, and
what conduct can be sanctioned. Yet, the bills share the same flaw:
it is virtually impossible to find a proper defendant from whom
consumers may seek adequate reparation. The proposed national
bills will provide for uniform regulations, which will increase
compliance and enforceability.'I 3 Legislation, however, allowing
spyware victims to sue identifiable defendants for harm caused by
spyware is the only way to create an incentive for those with the
means to prevent spyware to do something to stop the harm.
Therefore, legislation allowing Internet-related corporations to be
held liable for spyware activities attacks the spyware issue head on,
and is the only plausible way to meet legislators' goal of realistically
protecting American Internet users from malicious and surreptitious
spyware acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The spyware problem requires a national solution. 184 Legisla-
tion that provides clear guidelines and attainable remedies for
violations will encourage compliance out of fear of litigation.
Allowing states to govern this arena will only produce inconsistent
laws that will frustrate legitimate software companies while possibly
permitting those who violate privacy rights to "fall through the
cracks." Multiple inconsistent state laws could impose unrealistic
compliance costs on legitimate Internet companies, which may stifle
innovation and the Internet services our society requires.
Meanwhile, spyware companies may thrive on the inconsistencies,
and continue to engage in wrongful conduct, simply factoring the
cost of violations into their profit calculations.
183. See supra Part IV.A.3.
184. See Urbach, supra note 2, at 15.
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National legislation has the power to prevent deceptive spyware
companies from infecting innocent users' computers while
promoting innovation, legitimate business, and the proliferation of
useful software programs. Even California State Senator Kevin
Murray, the author of the California Act, stated, "[i]n the best of all
possible worlds, the federal government can do a broader job of
enforcing things .... I don't mind them preempting my bill, as long
as they preempt me with a bill that does something that is just as
strong and tough on behalf of the people."'
185
The inability to identify spyware programmers and websites
inflicting harm on users has made current state and national
legislation ineffective. Unlike the government, however, the com-
puter industry has the resources and capability to regulate spyware.
The industry should police its own excesses and federal legislation
should provide a strong incentive to do so. National legislation
allowing spyware victims to sue key industry players would provide
consumers with an identifiable defendant from whom to seek
effective redress. Industry leaders should either hold themselves
accountable, or be held accountable for failing to prevent programs
they know are malicious from traveling across their systems and
networks into the equipment of hapless users. Thus, national
legislation holding the Internet industry liable for surreptitious and
deceptive spyware harms is the most effective way to prevent
spyware from thriving anywhere within the United States and the
world.
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